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Rebuilding Iraq: Holistic Synchronization Plan is the Key

by

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ABSTRACT

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This paper will examine the processes that are an integral part of planning for the successful reconstruction effort used for the rebuilding of Iraq. It will review lessons learned related to reconstruction or nation-building from past wars such as the Philippine War, World War II in both Europe and Japan, Vietnam, and analyzes if these lessons are still applicable today. It also incorporates recent observations from Lieutenant General Chiarelli, previous Commander 1st Calvary Division, on his experience in full-spectrum operations in Iraq.

This paper develops and analyzes four options for the US to create an organization that will be manned to perform reconstruction and nation-building missions in the future. It explores in detail the advantages and disadvantages of each of these organizations. It also explores how to make this organization more efficient and how to utilize it to its fullest.

The US is spending billions of dollars on the reconstruction effort, which is needed to restore damage in some areas and to improve services to a minimum standard in others. However, these resources will not last forever and priorities will have to be established. A holistic synchronization is required for the reconstruction effort to successfully support the larger mission and a logical method to do that is proposed.

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Reconstruction Overview

The reconstruction of Iraq is by definition an engineering and construction problem — albeit — a large one. By itself, it would be a daunting task; however, in this particular case, it is only one piece of a much larger and more complex problem of stabilizing Iraq after the war. The successful rebirth of a new Iraq hinges on its success. The engineering and construction effort has to be synchronized with the security mission, the establishment of a new government, which includes providing reliable services to the public, and kick starting the Iraqi economy again. To be effective, all these missions must be synchronized between the different responsible parties: the Department of Defense, Department of State, Iraqi government, and other major stakeholders.

In the beginning, security was the paramount issue; but once President Bush announced on 1 May 2003 that major hostilities had ended, it was incumbent on the occupying force to then be responsible for providing the basic services that all populations expect from a government [1]. This would increase the complexity of the planning and execution significantly not only in number and diversity of tasks but also in number of stake holders to the issues. If the US and the new Iraqi government were unable or unwilling to do this, it would have multiple negative effects. First it would not be able to act as a force multiplier in the establishing the legitimacy of a new government. Second, it would erode the fragile confidence of the population at this crucial time. Thirdly, it would give those Iraqis who were undecided a reason to support the insurgency.

The success of the reconstruction effort is dependent on a number of factors: adequate security, planning, synchronization, prioritization, political backing, resourcing, execution, and communication. Throw in a little insurgency to complicate things and you start to get the picture that this is a complex puzzle that requires synchronized planning, communication, and execution between all the stakeholders. Rome wasn't built in a day and Iraq won't be rebuilt in a day either. In fact, it will take four years and a total of \$55 billion according to the World Bank and the Coalition Provisional Government (CPA) [2].

While this sounds like a lot of time and money, it is reasonable. Not so much from the damage caused in the March 2003 Iraq war, but more so from the accumulation of neglect over the last 25 years to the infrastructure. Other contributing factors include the war damage caused

from the 8 years war with Iran (1980-1988), from the first Gulf war (1990), and the impact of the U.N. sanctions afterward. Unfortunately, there is competition for funds. Congress funded \$2.5 billion in FY2003 and \$18.4 billion in Nov 2003 (FY2004) [3]. Of the \$18 billion, approximately \$12 billion is slated for infrastructure and \$6 billion for security.

Past Lessons Learned

Have we done this before? Were there any lessons learned? What else do we need to consider? So, who is going to plan for it? Who is going to execute the plan? How big is the problem? What are the priorities? These are typical questions that need to be addressed by the administration in charge. Looking to the past can help provide a roadmap to the future. The United States participated in several wars and occupations in the 20th century that we should look at in preparing for the current rebuilding effort in Iraq and the future. The following are examined here: the Philippine War, Europe and Japan after World War II, Vietnam, and some observations from Iraq.

The Philippine War and Pacification Effort

Lessons learned from the Philippine War and pacification effort have specific applicability to the Army today.

- ? **Transplanting democratic values to a society without a democratic tradition can involve the U.S. Army in a long and difficult mission.** The Philippine War lasted from 1898 to 1902, when President Theodore Roosevelt declared the war officially ended. However, occupation duty accompanied by a significant pacification campaign continued until 1912. During this period U.S. Army officers performed multiple government functions. The Army garrisoned over 60 towns and villages, where officers often served as civil administrators—mayor, school superintendents, directors of local police forces, etc. One general was a governor. These officers also began the process of training indigenous leadership in the process of good governance, but this was a lengthy endeavor that, together with other factors, led to independence only in 1946.

- ? **Knowledge of the local conditions and various insurgent motivations is critical to a successful counterinsurgency effort.** The U.S. Army in the Philippines faced a diverse set of opposition forces. During the war phase (1899-1902), much of it was organized and nationalistic in character. During the occupation phase (1902-1912), it was generally decentralized, and composed of Filipino tribal-religious groups, brigands of various sort, charismatic local leaders, and opportunist with varying motivations. To know and

understand the motivations of these sundry groups, U.S. Army officers needed lengthy tours of duty, knowledge of indigenous customs and culture, language skills, and involvement in local political dynamics. Such knowledge and experience enabled the U.S. Army to set up civic action programs that addressed grievances exploited by the insurgents. Knowledge of enemy motivations also enabled most commanders to determine the proper balance between coercion and conciliation in planning and executing campaigns against the various insurgents, and, with some exceptions, to limit very forceful actions to those against hard-core groups.

- ? **Successful pacification demands simultaneous and appropriately balance civil and military action.** One cannot make progress in pacification unless you first establish a political system that commands popular loyalty. In this view, political stability is the *sine qua non* for progress in other areas, such as training, economic development, and local counterinsurgent operations. A contrary view was that you cannot have political stability until you first conduct effective operations against the insurgent, largely because they will not permit stability otherwise. A composite view, supported by most participants, was that political stability and military actions go hand-in-hand, and that each contributes to the other. Soldiers in the Philippines had both a construction mission and a destruction mission. They needed to win Filipino loyalty, or at least neutrality, but they also occasionally needed to escalate violence to unacceptable levels for citizens and terrorist. The risk of alienating the population by strong military action needed to be carefully weighed against the necessity of attacking insurgents. The record in the Philippines shows that in-and-out punitive operations rarely achieved lasting results and often set back pacification efforts. Although not always done in practice, the ideal was to tilt the balance between military and civic action in favor of the latter.
- ? **Every soldier in a counter insurgency environment has civic action responsibilities, and the military leader on the spot is the best pacification agent.** All agreed that winning “hearts and minds” was important. In the Philippine case, U.S. Army personnel assisted the local population in eradicating disease, developing roads, building schools, providing sanitation, taking part in other developmental projects, and administering justice. They also spent money, which benefited many local people. By working closely with the indigenous population they developed intelligence networks that became increasingly effective over time. Civic action projects also helped with recruiting indigenous forces. Sustained contact with the local population required extended tours of duty, but was worth the effort, as positive contact with indigenous people became a prime ingredient of the successful pacification campaign.
- ? **Training an indigenous police force and army is a long-term key to success.** Filipino auxiliaries were essential to defeat the insurgency. By the end of the war, 15-20 percent of the regular forces were Filipino. U.S. Army officers served in a constabulary capacity until Filipino police could be recruited and trained. Because the constabulary was often outgunned, Filipino scouts units were placed under its control. Only after a learning period of several years did they succeed in suppressing the last banditry movement. The

Army also recruited and trained increasing numbers of Filipinos during the occupation, and the first several years their focus was heavily on pacification. Over time U.S. Army personnel trained not only Filipino scouts, but also junior field grade officer [4].

While these lessons are not specific to reconstruction, they certainly help identify the larger issues that are present and that need to be addressed in identifying projects and prioritizing the reconstruction dollars. Lessons still applicable today are: This will not happen overnight; we are there for the long-haul; we need local input to identification and prioritization of projects; we can't wait until the security problem goes away; we need to provide some funding decisions and the ability to act quickly to the local level in order to maximize impact; and funding programs and projects to support security are critical.

Post WWII Marshall Plan

On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall spoke at Harvard University and outlined what would become known as the Marshall Plan. Europe, still devastated by the war, had just survived one of the worst winters on record. The nations of Europe had nothing to sell for hard currency, and the democratic socialist governments in most countries were unwilling to adopt the draconian proposals for recovery advocated by old-line classical economists. Something had to be done, both for humanitarian reasons and also to stop the potential spread of communism westward...[5].

Marshall Plan Lessons Learned

- ? **You need a plan.** Success of the Marshall plan was built on the United States asking the leaders of Europe to get together and to provide a list of what needed to be done and the cost. This went through several iterations before Congress finally approved it. The United States was interested in stabilizing Europe so it would not slide into anarchy and to also provide a market for American industry. As such, projects were identified to rebuild Europe but also to bring stability by establishing basic components which society needed to build upon. Rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure was just one piece of the puzzle.
- ? **You need interagency coordination.** The Department of Defense and the Department of State have to work closely together to be successful. The speech and plan were initiated by the Secretary of State, previous General of the US Army, George C. Marshall. Detailed planning was coordinated with all the other Departments.

- ? **It will take a lot of money and time.** From 2 April 1958, when the President signed the Economic Cooperation Act that authorized the Marshall Plan, until 31 December 1951, the United States expended \$13.3 billion in approximately 4 years and Europe had recovered [6].
- ? **You need leadership.** The most experienced leadership is required to manage a task as large and important as this. President Harry S. Truman, with the advice and consent of Congress appointed Paul G. Hoffman, and Averell Harriman as managers of the program. Congress thought the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) could best be run by people with business and financial experience. Hoffman was president of the Studebaker automobile corporation, Harriman was also an experienced businessman [7].
- ? **You need an organization to execute.** The Economic Cooperation Administration was created by the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, approved April 3, 1948 to administer the European recovery program. Under the act, its operations were to be terminated on June 30, 1952 [8].
- ? **You need buy-in and support.** Communication of what is to be done and how it will affect the individual is a key to success. This provides a number of force multipliers. Most importantly, it tells the effected people what will be done. This helps in setting expectations, buy-in, and support. It helps focus random communication into a focused program to educate the population in a systematic way. If it has buy-in, then, the people have an incentive to help assist in making it possible. A number of different books and pamphlets were produced to educate the nations, business communities and general populations to what the Marshall plan was about and how it would affect them.
 - Book: The Marshall Plan and the Future of U.S. European Relations.
 - Book: The Marshall Plan and the Future of U.S. European Relations.
 - Book: The Marshall Plan And You.
 - Book: How To Do Business Under the Marshall Plan
 - Album: The Marshall Plan At The Mid-Mark [9].

Post WWII Japan

On September 2, 1945, General Mac Arthur presided over the Japanese surrender on board the "U.S.S. Missouri," bringing an end to World War II. MacArthur may have made his greatest contribution to history in the next five and a half years, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan. While initiating some policies and merely implementing others, by force of personality MacArthur became synonymous with the highly successful occupation. His staff helped a devastated Japan rebuild itself, institute a democratic government, and chart a course that has made it one of the world's leading industrial powers [10].

WWII Lessons Learned

- ? **Leadership is critical.** Continuity of leadership makes everything easier. General MacArthur was in control for 5-1/2 years.
- ? **Establishing the basis for all rules is critical.** Everything then flows from here.

The Constitution of Japan has been the founding legal document of Japan since 1947. The constitution provides for a parliamentary system of government and guarantees certain fundamental rights. Under its terms the Emperor of Japan is the *de facto* head of state but exercises a purely ceremonial role. The constitution is perhaps most famous for the renunciation of the right to wage war contained in Article 9.

The constitution was drawn up under the Allied occupation that followed World War II and was intended to replace Japan's previous imperial system with a form of liberal democracy. It is a rigid document and no subsequent amendment has been made to it since its adoption [11].

- ? **A highly trained, organized staff is required.** On 2 Sep 1945, General Headquarters of the United States Army Forces Pacific activated the following Special Staff Sections: Economic and Scientific; Civil Information and Education; Natural Resources; Public Health and Welfare; Government; Legal; Civil Communications; Statistical and Reports; Civil Intelligence [12].

Three months prior to Pearl Harbor being bombed in Dec 1941, the Judge Advocate General proposed Military Government training. The Provost Marshall General was in charge of the project. By 1 May 1942, the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia was up and processing student officers through in 16 weeks. Columbia University, Princeton, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy were

also interested in embarking on projects related to postwar problem. The procurement and training program was designed to produce, with the necessary rapidity, the following categories of personnel for military government: (a) top administrative commissioned personnel, (b) junior commissioned personnel, (c) occupational (or military government) military police, and (d) technical and advisory personnel. By 1945, there was over 6000 soldiers trained including the military police [13].

1 Mar 1943, Secretary of War, creates a Civil Affairs Division of the War Department to obtain complete synchronization throughout the Army on military government problems. On 8 Mar 1943, President directs Secretary of State to establish and assume Chairmanship of Interdepartmental Committee to study the need for civilian personnel for nonmilitary overseas service. Committee included Treasury, War, Navy, Justice Interior, Agriculture, Civil Service Commission, Board of Economic Warfare, Office of Lend Lease Administration, War Manpower Commission, Office of Foreign Relief & Rehab Operations, and War Shipping Administration.

- ? **You need to establish and maintain security.** Maintaining security after the war was crucial to implementing other policies and to overall success. This was maintained through a combination of planned events: Dropping of the two atomic bombs, signing of the unconditional surrender, keeping Emperor Hirohito as a figurehead and maintaining an adequate level of troop strength. This coupled with the nation's culture resulted in a relatively peaceful postwar. Even so, this is really quite remarkable given Japan's army's propensity for brutal actions outside the normal rules of war as were demonstrated during the Bataan death march, their treatment of prisoners of war, or the rape of Nanking.

Vietnam

- ? Massive military power was not the best or only weapon in Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC). The commandant of the Army War College commissioned a review of army strategy in Vietnam in 1974, to become known later as "Vietnam lessons learned study." The study was completed by BDM Corporation and published in June 1980.

"Massive military power was not the best or the only weapon in LIC situations like Vietnam. In such cases, political aspects were more important than winning

conventional military battles... In short, the report validated the concept that military operations should support civil affairs objectives.” [14].

Iraq

? The Vietnam lesson is consistent with Major General Peter Chiarelli’s recent experience in Bagdad, Iraq as the Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division. In a recent briefing to Senior Service College Fellows, he shared that you couldn’t just kill the bad guy without regard to the impact the operation had on the rest of the population because some of the more forceful operations tended to have the “fence sitters” side with the insurgency. He elaborated his views in *Winning the Peace, The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations* where he identified that a “balanced approach” was required to meet the campaign’s objective. Full spectrum operations had to be carried out simultaneously and in a balanced manner to be effective. They were identified as: Combat Operations, Train & Employ security forces, Essential Services, Promote Governance and Economic Pluralism. Based on this analysis, it is apparent that reconstruction projects are critical, but need to be coordinated with other elements and most definitely with security to be the maximize effectiveness. [15].

Evaluation of Past Lessons Learned

While we should keep the lessons of the past fully in mind as we plan for the future, we should take a minute to see if any fundamental changes have taken place or are different than the Iraq situation in which to question the validity of the lessons learned. The sections below indicate significant differences in certain aspects of each war. However, after close examination, even though there are differences in each of the events, it is interesting to note that the generalizations of the lessons learned above still hold true. That is because they were made at a macro or strategic level and not at the tactical level.

However, one lesson seems apparent. The ratio of troop strength to civilian population in Iraq at 1:179 is much less than Germany’s at 1:38 and is slightly less than Japan’s at 1:200. The populations of both Germany and Japan surrendered peacefully and did not have an Iraqi style terrorist resistance supported by outside entities. The US clearly is accepting much more risk in

ensuring security for the population during this delicate and transitional time for Iraq than it did in the past.

Philippine War:

- ? Relatively old example- 100years.
- ? Philippine's Population in the 1900's was only about 7 million people versus 25 million people for Iraq today.
- ? The Philippine's culture was not as diverse as Iraq's is today.
- ? The Philippine's are an archipelago made up of over 7000 islands of which there are less than a dozen large ones with a total of 115,124 square miles [16]. Iraq is close in size at 166,123 square miles but is one land mass [17].
- ? Communication methods and customs have changed.

Germany

- ? Germany was reduced to 144,000 square miles in 1946, but had 60 million people [18]. Troop levels in nation-building were much greater in Germany with a high point of as many as 1.6 million US troops [19]. This translates to a soldier to civilian ratio of 1:38.
- ? Ethnic make up was not as diverse
- ? Devastation of infrastructure, while great, was not exasperated by 25 years of neglect as in Iraq.
- ? The impact of Hitler was less than Saddam Hussein. Hitler was in power only 6 years prior to WWII (1933-1939) [20]. Saddam Hussein was in power for 24 years (1979-2003). Saddam had a much longer time to institutionalize his policies, eliminate any dissenters and subjugate his people. Attitudes and institutional memory of what a normal society were either forgotten or never acquired by most people that are currently 30 years old or younger.
- ? Germany's population had a well established middle and working class that was familiar with a market economy. On the other hand, a major percentage of Iraq's population including all younger people had a lack of an institutional memory of what a market economy was and the benefits of that system.

- ? The US had done more than 3 years of detailed war planning to assist in reconstruction efforts after the war II, but little planning for the reconstruction of Iraq [21].
- ? The German's had good incentive to cooperate with the US. US rule was a clear preference over the Russian rule to the Germans.

Japan

- ? The ethnic make up of Japan is much more consistent than that of Iraq.
- ? The cultural history of Japan is also much different than Iraq. Japan has been united since year 300 and while there have been internal conflicts, they have never been taken over by another country until WWII. Compare that with Iraq's history of being taken over more than a dozen different times.
- ? Their Emperor of Japan was kept as a figure head to keep the population in line.
- ? Japan also had a worse threat hanging over their heads and that encouraged them to cooperate and that was Russia. Russia never signed the peace treaty with Japan because they thought they should have been entitled to half of Japan.
- ? The US had 350,000 troops in Japan during the nation building after WWII. Japan had a population of approximately 70 million people [22]. This came to a soldier to civilian ratio of 1:200. This is similar to current Iraq with a population of 25 million and troops of approximately 140,000 or soldier to civilian ratio of 1:179. However, the security situation is much worse.

Iraq's History

It is important to understand Iraq from a historical view to help in rebuilding the country. Iraq's unique history, while not dictating, will influence the many courses of action and final decisions on how best to rebuild. However, in some ways, there will be a conscience decision to learn from the past and to avoid past practices.

Iraq has a long and rich past. It is over 5000 years. It has seen great times, poor times, and has been invaded over a dozen times by different conquerors. Each time, the conquerors imposed their will on the people and each time the society was changed.

The last 50 years have been no less violent. There were a number of military coups in the 20th century. By the 1950's, the first oil pipeline from Iraq's northern Kirkuk oil fields to Syria's

Mediterranean port of Banias was completed. This provided Iraq with a steady flow of money. In 1958, a group of military officers called the Free Officers revolted overthrew the monarchy, killed the king and crown prince and put the senior leader, 'Abd al-Karim Qasim in charge. In 1963, a faction of the army, in cooperation the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party started a rebellion. Qasim was executed and 'Abd as-Salam 'Arif assumed the presidency. The Army overthrew 'Arif in 1968 and Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr took over.

In 1979, al-Bakr resigned, and Saddam Hussein came to power. He went to war with Iran the next year in 1980 and it lasted for 8 years. The war drained Iraq economically, and then Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990. The United Nations sanctions after the war prevented Iraq from selling oil. That had a tremendous impact on Iraq's economy because 98% of their exports were from oil [23]. That in turn had a tremendous impact on the country's population.

The following condensed summary of Iraq's history clearly shows the past multiple influences and brings to light some of the tensions in today's society.

The Sumerians

- ? Sumerian civilization (ca 3000 - 2350 BC)
- ? Sumerian city-states.
- ? Sumerian territorial states.

The Akkadians

- ? The Akkadian empire (ca 2350-2112 BC).

The Empire of Ur III

- ? The third dynasty of Ur (ca 2112-2004 BC).

Old Babylonian Empire

- ? The Amorite empire of Babylon.
- ? The Hurrian and Mitanni kingdoms.
- ? Enuma Elish The Babylonian creation epic.

The Assyrian Empire

- ? Assyrian Empire (ca 1600-609 BC).
- ? Assyrian Kings' List.

The Neo-Babylonian Empire

- ? Chaldean Empire of Babylon (ca 626-539 BC).

Mesopotamia under the Persians & Greeks

- ? The Achaemenians (ca 539-331 BC).
- ? The Seleucids (ca 335-141 BC).
- ? The Parthians (ca 129 BC-224 AD).
- ? The Sasanids (ca 224-637 AD).

Mesopotamia under the Arabs - *Mesopotamia becomes "Iraq"*

- ? The Arab conquest (637 AD).
- ? The Abbasid Caliphate (749 -1180 AD). Foundation, flourishing and decline.
- ? The Zinj rebellion (869-883 AD).
- ? The Buyids (945-1055 AD).
- ? The Seljuqs (1055-1152 AD).
- ? The Abbasid Caliphate (1152-1258 AD). The later Abbasid period.

Iraq under the Mongols

- ? Iraq as a province in the Mongol Il-Khani Empire (1258- 1335).
- ? The Jalayrids (1336-1432).

Iraq under the Turkmen tribes

- ? The Kara Koyunlu (1375-1468).
- ? The Ak Koyunlu (1468-1508).

Iraq under the Safavids of Iran

- ? The brief Safavid period (1508-1534)

Iraq under the Ottoman Empire

- ? The Ottoman Iraq (1534-1918).
- ? Conquest and turbulent 16th century.
- ? 17th century, Disorder and brief Safavid occupation.
- ? 18th century, The Mamluks Era.
- ? The Fall of Mamluks and the British Interests.
- ? The reforms of Midhat Pasha.
- ? 19th century, Ottoman reforms.
- ? WW1, The end of Ottoman rule.

Iraq under the British control

- ? The Conquest and direct rule (1918-1932).

The Modern state of Iraq

- ? The Independence (1932).
- ? WW2 and British intervention (1939-1945).
- ? Postwar era and the reforms' attempt (1945-1958).
- ? Revolution and the first republic (1958).

- ? The coup of 1963, The fall of first republic (1963-1968).
- ? The coup of 1968, Ba'th Nightmare begins (1968).
- ? Economic development until the war.
- ? Saddam gets to the power in Iraq (1979).
- ? War with Iran (1980-1988).
- ? War with United Nations Coalition (1990).
- ? War with US and limited Coalition, overthrow of Hussein (2003).
- ? Transition to a democratic government (2003- present) [24].

Organizational Options

Iraq

So who and what organization is going to lead the reconstruction effort? More importantly, can we learn from this event and improve in our preparedness for the next event?

On 11 Feb 2003, Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, announced that the President directed on 20 Jan 2003 the creation on a post-war planning office. It was named the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and LTG (ret) Jay Garner was appointed Director. There were three substantive operations: Humanitarian Relief, Reconstruction, and Civil Administration. Garner was responsible for organizing and integrating the work of the three operations, travel to the region and plug in CENTCOM's operations [25]. The war started at 0230 GMT on 20 March and President Bush announced on 1 May 2003 that major hostilities had ended.

Obviously, the quick pace of events did not give the ORHA very much time to pull an experienced team together, establish command and control, coordinate with the military planners, establish an administrative and logistical support base and structure, conduct a thorough assessment of the situation, establish priorities, and identify resources that would be needed. The missions they had prepared for — such as preparing to put out oil fires, repair

massive damage to the oil fields and take care of a large refugee population — never became a reality. There was much less damage to the oil fields and the Army's rapid advance had not brought about the amount of dislocation of the civilian population that had been anticipated. There was a tremendous amount of information not known about the infrastructure. Unfortunately, looting broke out and the situation on the ground deteriorated quickly.

On 11 May 2003, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III replaced Garner, but the scope of Bremer's powers and responsibility was broadened. He was appointed as Presidential Envoy to Iraq with full authority over all US government personnel, activities, and funds there. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, followed up designating him administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), empowered with "all executive, legislative, and judicial functions" in Iraq [26]. He had no command authority over the Coalition troops but the US Central Command (CENTCOM) was to coordinate their operations with both the CPA and Bremmer. His chain-of-command ran through the Rumsfeld to the President.

It had been reported in the press that the Department of State had put together a fifteen-volume study providing a full plan for postconflict activities in the country. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, a deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, had worked on the plan and indicated it was never intended as a postwar plan. Its purpose was to engage Iraqi-Americans thinking about their country's future after Saddam was ousted. After reviewing the plan, Ambassador Paul Bremer agreed with this assessment [27].

The CPA established a Governing Council made up of Iraqi's that was representative of the Iraqi people along with establishing ministries and appointing temporary ministers to run those organizations. Together they established a constitution and elections that brought about the start of a democracy.

Lessons Learned from the Past

Three months prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, the US Army was extremely forward thinking and had already identified the need to train Army personnel in the unique mission involving military government or liaison with an existing government. When the need

came to assume the mission, both in Europe and the Pacific, they were in much better position to perform.

The Next Conflict

I would like to broaden that concept of forward thinking to include an organizational concept. I propose the government develop an organization that can be called upon quickly to react effectively and in a coordinated manner with the other elements of government required to be successful. There are four options outlined below. Each one has its advantages and disadvantages. One of the major differentiators would also be cost. However, as cost goes up, the risk goes down. Government will have to decide where along this sliding scale best meets its short and long term goals.

- ? **Option 1: Fulltime Organization.**
- ? **Option 2: Standup Organization.**
- ? **Option 3: Partially Filled Organization.**
- ? **Option 4: Administrative Organization.**

Option 1: Fulltime Organization

This organization is made up of handpicked quality leaders. The organizational structure is predetermined and its personnel slots are fully filled. The organization analyzes the different missions it may be assigned and develops courses of actions to quickly and efficiently prosecute those missions. Mission essential task lists are developed along with Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) and processes. It develops and strengthens lines of communication and coordination with supporting agencies in a peacetime environment. Internally, it practices, identifies weaknesses within processes, and then improves those processes. Once ready, it then participates in exercises with the Combatant Commanders' staffs (planners) and with the Joint Task Forces (executors). This helps broaden the learning process for all participating organizations on issues the planners and executors may need to consider to reach higher level organizational goals. Training in potential hotspots will familiarize the organization with the unique issues within that area or region. The organization develops a cohesion that is important in a hostile environment and where individuals are under pressure to perform. Training is

identified for individuals and teams to become more competent in their tasks. Both Budget and Contracting processes will be well developed and functional which will be crucial for this organization's success. This is a learning organization. It collects, analyzes and incorporates lessons learned.

Advantages:

- ? **Leadership:** High. Quality leaders are selected prior to events happening.
- ? **Personnel:** Personnel slots are already filled with trained personnel.
- ? **Organizational structure:** Already determined.
- ? **Mission Essential Task Lists:** Documented.
- ? **Level of Training:**
 - o **Collective:** High.
 - o **Team:** High.
 - o **Individual:** High.
- ? **Cohesion:** High.
- ? **Lines of communication to support base:** High.
- ? **Level of effectiveness:** Highest level possible.
- ? **Capability of improving in the next event:** High.
- ? **Risk:** Low.

Disadvantages:

- ? **Cost of Organization:** Highest, as compared to other options.

Option 2: Standup Organization

This organization is not identified or staffed until an event happens. It is headed by a handpicked quality leader that may be uniquely qualified for the mission. The leader then determines the organizational structure and picks personnel from whatever sources are made available to him to fill out the staff. This may be a large or small pool of individuals and time may be limited. The mission will probably be much more vaguely identified just because it can be. Individuals will determine what tasks need to be prioritized in each section and across the

organization. While individual skills may be high, team and collective processes will still take time to establish, build and improve on. Cohesion of the unit will be low initially. Lines of communication and coordination internal and external to the organization will have to be established.

Advantages:

- ? **Leadership:** Potentially high. Quality leaders may or may not be available.
- ? **Personnel:** Trained personnel are selected for key slots from a limited pool based on availability.
- ? **Level of Training:**
- ? **Individual:** High.
- ? **Cost of Organization:** Low as compared to other options. No cost in between events.

Disadvantages:

- ? **Organizational structure:** Undetermined initially.
- ? **Mission Essential Task Lists:** Unknown. Initially needs to be developed and documented
- ? **Level of Training:**
 - **Collective:** Low.
 - **Team:** Low.
- ? **Cohesion:** Low.
- ? **Lines of communication to support base:** Not established.
- ? **Level of effectiveness:** Potentially high or low, but not right away.
- ? **Capability of improving in the next event:** Low.
- ? **Risk:** Medium to High.

Option 3: Partially Filled Organization

This option provides a cost effective solution to an irregularly occurring event but minimizes the risks of having to start an organization from scratch. This organization is similar

to Option 1 in that the quality leaders are handpicked from a large pool of qualified candidates. The organizational structure is predetermined. However, fulltime personnel are selected and hired to fill key personnel positions up to a maximum of 20% of the total personnel requirement. The other slots are filled with selected individuals who then participate in scheduled training events to improve team and collective training skills. The advantage to this is that these highly qualified personnel can be actively apart of other organizations building on their individual skills sets but will still be available when called for duty. Of course this will have to be worked out, but it will save money and is similar to the concept used for the National Guard. The organization analyzes the different missions it may be assigned and develops courses of actions to quickly and efficiently prosecute those missions. Mission essential task lists are developed along with Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) and processes. It develops and strengthens lines of communication and coordination with supporting agencies in a peacetime environment. Internally, it practices, identifies weaknesses within processes, and then improves those processes. Once ready, it then participates in exercises with the Combatant Commanders' staffs (planners) and with the Joint Task Forces (executors). This helps broaden the learning process for all participating organizations on issues the planners and executors may need to consider to reach higher level organizational goals. Training in potential hotspots will familiarize the organization with the unique issues within that area or region. The organization develops a cohesion that is important in a hostile environment and where individuals are under pressure to perform. This cohesion is built at a slower rate than Option 1 but much faster than Option 2. Training is identified for individuals and teams to become more competent in their tasks. Both Budget and Contracting processes will be well developed and functional which will be crucial for this organization's success. This is a learning organization. It collects, analyzes and incorporates lessons learned.

Advantages

- ? **Leadership:** High. Quality leaders are selected prior to events happening.
- ? **Personnel:** High. Key fulltime positions are filled to a maximum of 20% of total requirements. All other slots are filled with trained personnel from other organizations that will train and be available if needed.
- ? **Organizational structure:** Already determined.

- ? **Mission Essential Task Lists:** Documented.
- ? **Level of Training:**
 - **Collective:** Medium.
 - **Team:** High.
 - **Individual:** High.
- ? **Cohesion:** High.
- ? **Lines of communication to support base:** High.
- ? **Level of effectiveness:** High.
- ? **Capability of improving in the next event:** High.
- ? **Risk:** Low.
- ? **Cost of Organization:** Less than $\frac{1}{2}$ the cost of Option 1, but higher than Option 2.

Disadvantages

Personnel: Partial fill of qualified personnel from other organizations is a new concept to most organizations and will have to be worked out.

Option 4: Administrative Organization

This type of organization would be structured to address all the issues normally envisioned in a nation-building or reconstruction effort. However, it would only do the planning, it would not execute. It would be fully staffed with fulltime employees from each government agency within their area of expertise. These highly experienced personnel would establish the policies and procedures to be followed by the organization in an event. They would also provide the communication links back to each of the host agencies and could act in a rear support effort to the executing organization in an event. They would participate in the planning and execution of training events with the military and all other organizations. It would be a learning organization, able to capture and improve processes from their exercises. It would also have the time to research past events and bring forward those lessons learned as well. It could help identify the templates for future events to quickly organize a task force to respond to an event including such things as organizational structure, number of personnel, their expertise, equipment, and resourcing. Benefits would be to be able to identify training requirements for

personnel beforehand, identifying certain personnel to fill those requirements along with logistical support and communication issues.

Advantages

- ? **Leadership:** High. Quality leaders are selected to run the administrative organization, but the best qualified individual will have to be selected from the available pool of individuals for the organization that will execute the plan.
- ? **Personnel:** High. Fulltime positions are filled with quality individuals from throughout government for the administrative positions. A list of highly qualified individuals is made and updated of personnel who would be called in the case of an event occurring.
- ? **Organizational structure:** Administrative organization structure already determined. Also acts as a rear support to the executing organization. Executing organizational structure predetermined with different task force templates.
- ? **Mission Essential Task Lists:** Documented.
- ? **Level of Training:** Administrative Organization
 - **Collective:** High.
 - **Team:** High.
 - **Individual:** High.
- ? **Lines of communication to support base:** High.
- ? **Level of effectiveness:** High.
- ? **Capability of improving in the next event:** High.
- ? **Risk:** Low.
- ? **Cost of Organization:** Less than Option 1 and Option 3 but higher than Option 2.

Disadvantages:

- ? **Leadership of Executing Organization:** Is dependent on available personnel unless they are pre-selected.
- ? **Level of Training:** Executing Organization
 - **Collective:** Low.
 - **Team:** Low.
 - **Individual:** High.

- ? **Cohesion:** Low.

Utilization of Organization

The US will have to make an ongoing investment in whichever organization it chooses. The expenditure of funds for the risk mitigated will bear some scrutiny given the rather infrequent amount of nation-building or reconstruction efforts. However, the US must be successful in these times of great need because the success or failure of nations rests on the successful execution of their missions.

I would propose that the US expand the utilization of this organization to assist all nations in the world in responding to natural disasters. This would provide a number of very beneficial results to both the US and the organization. Employment of the organization could be done on a limited basis in order to ensure a successful ramp up stage while the organization increased its capability. The following benefits would be realized.

- ? **Cost is inexpensive:** First, the US could provide leadership to the world at a relatively inexpensive cost in providing planning functions to help a nation stand back up after a natural occurrence. Recent examples that were this organization could have helped were: countries affected by the tsunami in the south pacific, the earthquake in Pakistan, and hurricane Mitch in Honduras. It could also assist if requested in internal events such as hurricane Katrina in the US.
- ? **Meets national security strategy:** It would be in line with chapter VII and VII of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America dated March 2006: Chapter VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy and Chapter VIII: Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power
- ? **Strengthens diplomatic ties:** It would help to develop stronger diplomatic ties between us and other nations. It would provide a bridge to between us and countries we have strained ties with.
- ? **Opens foreign markets:** It would help open foreign markets to US engineering and contracting firms to be able to partner with and build lasting relationships.

- ? **Provides hands-on experience:** It would provide valuable hands-on experience to the organization. This would help build individual, team and collective skills of the organization.
- ? **Attracts quality personnel:** A higher utilized organization will attract higher quality personnel and broaden the capacity for the agency to recruit.
- ? **Assists future planning:** It would give the organization hands-on training in different parts of the world. The organization will learn how to deal with issues like culture, language, religion, topography, climate, and different governments in preparation for the challenges in the regions in the future.
- ? **Collection of lessons learned:** It would allow the organization to evaluate and streamline processes based on real life events.
- ? **Cost effective:** It would increase the actual utilization of the organization making it more cost effective.
- ? **Identify strengths and weaknesses:** It would identify strengths and weaknesses where leadership could better understand when, where and how the organization could be utilized, and more importantly, where it couldn't.

Prioritization of Projects

Once an event occurs, the immediate need is for an assessment. Unfortunately, in any major event there, typically, are a number of restricting conditions that come into play: security, transportation, access to locations, personnel, and information, may be limited. It will save an enormous amount of time and energy on the ground during an event the more trouble spots can be identified early on and prior planning can take place.

However, once an event does take place and a successful assessment is complete such as the one done in Iraq by the World Bank and CPA, you need to prioritize the projects for funding and execution. This is a critical step and methods to do this are not well documented. I recommend the following method for use.

For the situation in Iraq, and in all others, a quick and holistic approach would be to group projects based on their area of government or ministry. This provides a list of like type projects that will be easier to prioritize. All projects in each area are then totaled and prioritized

to identify what was needed by that ministry. Based on available funding, a total government evaluation could be done to identify at what level each ministry should be funded to support the overall government by comparing what project would fall off the list if not funded as compared to another. It should be understood that this is done at the macro level and the flexibility still needs to be given to the ministries to adjust projects as new information is made available and as the situation and, therefore, priorities change throughout the year. As 19th century Prussian Field Marshal von Moltke said, “No battle plan ever survives the first contact with the enemy.” The same could be said for the execution of a budget.

Ministries should consider the following questions when prioritizing their projects for funding and execution


- ? What is the cost?
- ? How many people does it affect?
- ? What is the cost per individual benefit?
- ? Is this project required before other projects can be started?
- ? How do you want to spread the projects between provinces, cities, urban areas?
- ? Can projects be consolidated to save cost?
- ? Can projects be grouped by location to help in security?
- ? What do the local leaders and people in the provinces say is most important?
- ? What is the level of risk or what percent contingency should be included?.
- ? How quickly do we need these projects to be done?
- ? How many locals do these projects put to work?
- ? Can these projects be accomplished with local contractors or outside contractors?
- ? What do the Ministries say is most important within their ministry?

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

Due to the severe lack of basic needs of many people in many areas of Iraq, it is beneficial to review Maslow's hierarchy of needs to provide a reliable methodology to identify, evaluate, and to help prioritize those projects. We will only visit the bottom two layers of the

pyramid below, Philological Needs and Safety Needs, in order to get a firm grasp on what the most important projects should address and fix in a timely manner. It is amazing how accurate these rankings are for people in dire need. The last statement on discussing the need for security which says “sometimes the desire for safety outweighs the requirement to satisfy physiological needs completely,” has become painfully obvious in Iraq during 2003-2005 and gives clear guidance on spending priorities now and in the future.

Maslow's hierarchy of needs is a theory in psychology that Abraham Maslow proposed in his 1943 paper *A Theory of Human Motivation*, which he subsequently extended. His theory contends that as humans meet 'basic needs', they seek to satisfy successively 'higher needs' that occupy a set hierarchy. Maslow's hierarchy of needs is often depicted as a pyramid consisting of five levels: the four lower levels are grouped together as *deficiency needs* associated with physiological needs, while the top level is termed *growth needs* associated with psychological needs. While our deficiency needs must be met, our *being* needs are continually shaping our behaviour.



Physiological Needs

The physiological needs of the organism, those enabling homeostasis, take first precedence. These consist mainly of:

- the need to breathe
- the need for water
- the need to eat
- the need to dispose of bodily wastes

- the need to for sleep
- the need to regulate body temperature
- the need for protection from microbial aggressions (hygiene)

When some of the needs are unmet, a human's physiological needs take the highest priority. As a result of the prepotency of physiological needs, an individual will deprioritize all other desires and capacities. Physiological needs can control thoughts and behaviors, and can cause people to feel sickness, pain and discomfort.

Safety Needs

- When the physiological needs are met, the need for safety will emerge. Safety and security ranks above all other desires. These include:
 - Security of employment
 - Security of revenues and resources
 - Physical Security – violence, delinquency, aggressions
 - Moral and physiological security
 - Familial security
 - Security of health
 - A properly-functioning society tends to provide a degree of security to its members.
 - Sometimes the desire for safety outweighs the requirement to satisfy physiological needs completely [28].

Conclusion

The reconstruction of Iraq and other nation-building events requires a well-led, cohesive, organization filled with quality, trained personnel using streamlined processes and holistic synchronization methods to achieve a quick and efficient result in hostile and fluid environments. Lessons of the past can and should be applied to the future. Historical and cultural aspects need to be studied and considered in developing courses of action and prioritization of projects in order to maximize the their effectiveness.

This paper presents four different options for a future organization that should be considered in preparing the US for the next event. The advantages and disadvantages are laid out in detail. The organization that provides the most capability is Option 1; however, it is also the most costly. Option 4 is the most cost efficient but also assumes the largest amount of risk for future success. All options will provide the US a greater capability to respond to future events.

This paper lays out a number of reasons why this organization could and should be utilized in between major wars to the benefit of both the organization and the US's foreign policy.

Prior planning is critical to responding quickly and efficiently. This paper encourages a holistic approach to project prioritization and provides a list of questions that can be used by planners to group and rank projects for funding and execution. It also identifies and recommends Maslow's hierarchy of needs as a proven framework that can be used to prioritize projects to meet the basic fundamental needs of people in a logical order. In most cases, there will be many more projects than available funds and decisions on what projects need to be accomplished and this will receive a great deal of attention after the fact. Building logical processes into the organization early on will assist in this important function.

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